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THE AVAILABILITY TO THE SYNDICATOR OF THE
PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION TO THE
CALIFORNIA CORPORATE
SECURITIES LAW
In financing the development of a shopping center or the acquisition of a race
horse,1 the syndicator 2 is usually interested in a lithe entity, quick in formation
and relatively free of state regulation. 4 The limited partnership or joint adventure
entity provides him just such agility, provided that he does not have to take the
burdensome step of obtaining a permit to sell securities from the Commissioner of
Corporations. 5

The syndicator may free himself of this step if the offering can qualify under
the private offering exemption to the Corporate Securities Law.0 To qualify, it
must be an offering of partnership or ]omt adventure interests, and it must not be
offered to the public. In a milieu of project-onented syndication where the syndicator is constantly bringing together new combinations of investors, these requirements are peculiarly elusive. Tis comment will discuss these requisites of the
private offering exemption, and the availability of the exemption to the syndicator.
No adequate definition of the ambiguous phrase "not offered to the public"
has been established by the Califorma courts, nor is the business community sure
of the meaning given it by the Commissioner of Corporations. 7 Therefore, in del McDonald, Syndication Is the New Big Game at the Racetrack, Fortune, Jan.
1966, p. 159.

2 A syndicator is the promoter of an association of individuals, formed for the purpose of conducting and carrying out some particular transaction, ordinarily of a financial
character, in which the members are mutually interested. See generally Leighton & Kent,

What Is a Syndicate?, in CAYiFomui

REn_.AL
ESTATE SYNicATEs An

INvEsrmENT TAEusTs

§ 1.1-1.25 (1962). See also Swanson, Syndication as a Vehicle for Investment in Real
Estate, April 19, 1961 (unpublished thesis on file in the Social Science Library, University of California, Berkeley).
8B. Smith, Real Estate Syndication, in REAL ESTATE INVEsTmENT PaomrxTi 103
(1964).
4 A prominent attorney dealing in land development related several instances in
which the delay resulting from having to obtain a permit resulted in the loss of the
project. Interview With F M. Nicholas, Beverly Hills Attorney, in Beverly Hills, Aug.
1965. On the other hand, an Oakland firm dealing primarily in real property law related that it found the obtaining of a permit from the Commissioner of Corporations no
hindrance, feeling that most resistance in applying for a permit comes from a preconceived distaste for state regulation. As a result the firm feels that the syndicator is
far safer in subjecting himself to regulation than to try the various methods to avoid it.
Interview With M. Starr, Oakland Attorney and Author, in Oakland, Feb. 18, 1966. It
is the writer's opinon that the burden of state control is dependent on the individual
state administrator and on familiarity with the Division of Corporations' procedure.
Therefore, if one is dealing with a good state administrator, although he may encounter
problems in ascertaining the requirements and procedures of the Commissioner, on
his first application for a permit, subsequent applications should prove relatively quick
and efficient.
5CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 25000-26104.
6 CAL. CoRp. Co.DE § 25100(m).
71nterview With H. Miller, Attorney and Author, in Oakland, Feb. 19, 1966.
Interview With F M. Nicholas, Beverly Hills Attorney, in Beverly Hills, Aug. 1965.
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veloping a definition our concern will be to observe the definition given to the
same phrase as it is employed in the private offering exemption to the federal
Securities Act of 1933,8 then to consider the California court decisions, the practices of the Division of Corporations, and finally the modus operandi of attorneys
engaged in syndication.
Before drawing any analogy to the federal act, we must consider two points of
divergence between the California and federal acts: (1) while the federal act is
designed to promote full disclosure of the material facts of the issue, the Califorma
act is designed to protect the investing public9 "against the imposition-of unsubstantial schemes and the securities based upon them"' 0 by requiring the Commissioner in the first instance to determine "that the proposed plan of business of
the applicant and the proposed issuance of securities are fair, just, and equitable,
that the applicant intends to transact its business fairly and honestly, and that the
securities that it proposes to issue and the method to be used by it in issuing or
disposing of them are not such as, in his opinion, will work a fraud upon the
purchaser thereof
"11 and (2) while the private offering exemption to the
federal act concerns all types of securities,' 2 the exemption to the Califorma act
concerns only partnership interests, joint adventure interests, and promissory
notes.' s The effect of these differences will be seen throughout the remainder
of this note.
There have been four major considerations accepted under the federal act
for determining whether an offer is private or public; (1) the number of offerees,
(2) the character of the offerees, (3) the manner of offering, and (4) the number
of units and their denomination. 14 Our concern will be with the first two factors.
As to the latter two, it is sufficient to note that if the manner of offering includes
the use of mass media advertising or an underwriter, 15 the offer will be considered
public; and, while under the federal exemption the number of units and
their denomination may be of importance, they are not important under the
California exemption, which is limited to entities that do not normally issue share
certificates in large quantities.
The Number of Offerees
Writers have stressed that it is not the number of ultimate investors that is
of concern, but rather the number of offerees.' 6 For a number of years the Se8

Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964).

9 Leighton & Kent, Federal and State Securities Regulations, in
ESTATE SNDIcATmS A=D INvxsmEF.T r TnusTs 179 (1962).

CALwoiRN

REAL

10 In re Leach, 215 Cal. 536, 543, 12 P.2d 3, 6 (1932), quoting Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1916).
1l CAL. Corp. CODE § 25507.
12 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77d(2) (1964).
's CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25100(l), (in).
14 Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F Supp. 975, 977 (W.D. Pa. 1951). See generally
SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 285, Jan. 24, 1935.
15People v. Hoshor, 92 Cal. App. 2d 250, 206 P.2d 882 (1949); People v. Woodson, 78 Cal. App. 2d 132, 177 P.2d 586 (1947). But see Collier v. Mikel Drilling
Company, 183 F Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1958), where middleman received commission
and yet offering was held to be private.
161 Loss, SEcUmrrs RE:GuLATioN 655-656 (1961). See generally Corporation Trust
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curities Exchange Commission used the magic number of twenty-five offerees as
the point where the offering normally turned public.17 Then in 1953, the Supreme
Court in SEC v. Ralston PurinaCo., 18 m holding that an offering to several hundred key employees was private, rejected any arbitrary standard based on the
number of offerees, stating that the applicability of the exemption should turn
on whether the particular class of persons affected need the protection of the act.
Under this standard an offering could be public whether the offerees were "few
or many." But the magic number was not cast aside completely. The court suggested that the Commissioner could still use twenty-five offerees as a "rule of
thumb" to indicate when an investigation should be ordered. 19
California has not judicially accepted any criterion based on a specific number
of offerees. However, in Camerirz v. Long 20 the court did consider offerings to
forty-six and thirty-four persons as private. On the other hand, in Mary Pickford
Co. v. Bayly Bros., Inc.,21 which was decided under a now defunct California
statute, 22 similar to the federal exemption, the court held that despite the small
size of the group solicited, the offering was to the public. Then again in People
v. Whelpton,2s decided under the present California exemption, the court held
that even though the group solicited was small, and was in fact made up of all
stockholders of the offering corporation, the offering was to the public. However,
these cases are of little help in providing a concrete standard. In Whelpton the
court did not relate the number of actual offerees, and found that while the form
of the interest was a promissory note, which is exempt from the act if not offered
to the public, the substance of the interest was corporate stock which is not
exempt even if offered privately. No matter how many offerees, the offering in
that case could not have been exempt. 24 In Pickford, while the number of actual
offerees was small, the court found that they were picked at random and therefore
were just part of a general offering to the public.2 5 Under California case law
there is no indication as to the minimum number of offerees which will constitute
the public.
Unlike the Securities Exchange Commission, the California Division of CorCo. v. Logan, 52 F Supp. 999 (D. Del. 1943); SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No.
4552, Nov. 6, 1962, p. 2.
17 1 Loss, SEcurrIEs RE GuLATiox 662 (1961).
18346 U.S. 119 (1953).
19 Id. at 125; SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962. "On the

pragmatic rather than the semantic level, therefore, the Supreme Court's opinon seems
to have had little effect on the traditional position taken by the Commission except perhaps to strengthen it." 1 Loss, Svcuiu'rs REGULATION 661 (1961).
20 184 Cal. App. 2d 292, 8 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1960).
2112 Cal. 2d 501, 86 P.2d 102 (1939).
22 Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 532 § 2(b), at 674 as amended by Cal. Stat. 1925, ch. 447

§ 2(7)d, at 962: "Any instrument offered for sale, or sold, or issued, to the public by
any company, evidencing or representing any nght to participate or share
earnings or income
2399

in

the profits,

Cal. App. 2d 828, 222 P.2d 935 (1950).

24 Id. at 831, 222 P.2d at 937.
25
"Persons to be solicited were selected at random, although a number of former
purchasers of securities from each firm were invited to invest
"12 Cal. 2d at 514,
86 P.2d at 108.

NOTES
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porations has not established a specific number of offerees as a rule of thumb to
determine when an investigation should be made. 26 Whether such a rule of thumb
is used depends largely on the individual deputy commissioner concerned. In
one instance a deputy suggested that he did use the twenty-five person rule of
thumb, 27 and in another a deputy indicated that he would scrutimze an offering
to any number. 28 However, number is an important factor and as the offerees
grow more numerous the Commissioner will become more concerned, and at a
point, perhaps 250-300 offerees, the offering will be considered public no matter
29
what other factors are present that would indicate that it should be private.
As to federal law, Professor Loss believes that it seems relatively safe to
assume that an offering to not more than twenty-five persons will be considered
exempt (at least as far as Comnussion intervention as distinct from civil liability
is concerned) and that other factors become important only when it is desired
to approach a greater number of offerees.30 However, since the California exemption is limited to partnership and joint adventure interests, which are abhorred
31
by the Commissioner due to a lack of investor control in the limited partnership,
and the unlimited liability in the general partnership and joint adventure, it is
understandable that the commission may give the term a stricter interpretation.
Therefore, no assumption can be made that twenty-five offerees is a safe number.
While the syndicator may justly believe that his successful twenty or twenty-five
partner syndicate will escape the eye of the Commissioner, if the project fails,
the disheartened investor will be the first to bring the question of "public offering"
to light and into the Commissioner's view. This is when the syndicate needs the
protection of the exemption. In summary, it may be said that while the number
of offerees is an important factor in determining whether the exemption is available, the syndicator must never rely on number alone to free himself from regulation.
The uncertainty of the term "public" has resulted in proposals that the term
"public offering" be abandoned in favor of a more concrete standard.8 2 For ex26
Interview With Robert LaNoue, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, in
Sacramento, Nov. 1965.
27 Telephone Interview With a Deputy Commissioner of Corporations, in Los
Aug. 1965.
Angeles,
28
Interview With H. Mattes, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, C. San
Felipe, Deputy Commissioner of Corporations, and C. Howard, Supervising Deputy
sioner of Corporations, in San Francisco, Feb. 24, 1966.
Commi
29
Interview With Robert LaNoue, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, in
Sacramento, Nov. 1965; Interview With M. Starr, Attorney and Author, m Oakland,
Feb. 18, 1966.
80 1 Loss, Sxcunrrn REGuLArioz 664 (1961).
3
lInterview With Robert LaNoue, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, in
Sacramento, Nov. 1965; Interview With H. Mattes, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, C. San Felipe, Deputy Commissioner of Corporations, and C. Howard, Supervismg 2 Deputy Commissioner of Corporations in San Francisco, Febt 24, 1966.
3 Interview With F M. Nicholas, Attorney and Author, in Beverly Hills, Aug.
1965. "The exemption (to the Uniform Securities Act) nowhere uses the undefined
This is one recommendation on which the advice recriterion of a 'public offering'
ceived was virtually unanimous because of the experience at the federal level." Draftsman's Commentary to the UNimoaM Scuums ACT § 402(B) (9) in Loss & Cow=-r,
BLUE Sxy LAW

372-73 (1958).
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ample, the Uniform Securities Act provides that an offer to less than ten persons
should be prima facie exempt. 83 Other states have set the limit of offerees at
thirty, twenty-five, and ten.34 However, California, in considering the adoption
of the Uniform Act, proposed the retention of the present exemption, rather than
the adoption of the ten person standard.3 5
Considering that most of the small private offering exemptions in other states
and under the federal regulations are associated with a criterion ranging from ten
to thirty, it would seem reasonable that the Califorma courts will consider that
an offer to between ten and twenty-five is prima facie private. Further, while the
Division of Corporations has failed to commit itself to a numerical criterion, if a
syndicator approached only fifteen to twenty-five specific offerees and of this
number, ten to fifteen chose to associate in the entity, it would seem reasonable
for the Division also to consider the offering prima face private. While this is
not the Division's present policy, it would be advantageous for it to implement,
since it would give the syndicator a secure mnimum standard without significantly
endangering the public at large.
Character of Offerees
Three characteristics of the offeree which bear on the determination of
whether an offer is private or public are: (1) the knowledge of the offeree; (2)
the sophistication of the offeree; and (3) the relation of the offeree to the offeror
and to the other offerees.
The Offeree's Knowledge
Under the federal act the knowledge aspect of the test for determining
386
whether an offer is public was first espoused in Ralston Purina,
the Court stating
that the class of persons who would not be considered "public" were those who
did not need the protection of the act-those who, because of their position, had
access to the same land of information that the act would make available.
While there is no question that the paternalistic California act contemplates
more in the way of investor protection than the full disclosure required by the
federal act, tlus factor of knowledge either supplied directly to the investor or
accessible to hun is the keystone of protection.'The knowledge the Division of
Corporations requires is a knowledge of the character as well as the skill of the
issuer, a knowledge of the risks and opportunities of the project, and a knowledge
of the entity he is to join.T8
Most syndicators as a matter of course develop a prospectus outlining the risks
and opportunities of the project and the background of the syndicator. 88 Howas Id. at 373.
84 Id. at 369-70.
85A.B. No. 2531, proposed CAL. Conp. CODE § 25402 (a) 14-15, m AssmBmLY INTmm Cownrrr
ON x JumiCIiCY, The Uniform Securities Act, AssEMmLY INTmmi
Comrrmm REPORTS 70-71 (1959-60). But see A.B. No. 2531, proposed CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 25402(b) (9),(12), in ASSEMBLY INTEMM CoivsUrrx ON =x Jum LXny, The
Uniform Securities Act, ASSFmBLY INTEim Co w-r.E REPORTS 25; 30 (1959-60).

86 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953).

87 Interview With Robert LaNoue, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, in
Sacramento, Nov. 1965.
8s B. Smith, Real Estate Syndication, in RPAL EsrATE IvEsTmsr TorEiRr 103

(1964).
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ever, while the protection to be afforded under the California act and especially
under the federal act is adequate information, merely supplying the offeree with
the same information that he would get if the act were complied with is not
necessarily sufficient to exempt one from regulation. To hold that it is, argues the
Securities Exchange Commission, would undermine effective regulation, since it
would give each issuer the choice of registering or making its own voluntary disclosures without regard to the standards or sanctions of the federal act.3 9 Under
this view it would be best for the syndicator to deal with offerees who already
were in a position of knowledge. This type of sophisticated offeree will be considered in the next section. Thus, while it is essential that the offeree is provided
with the material facts of the offering in some manner, this alone may not be
sufficient to gain the exemption.
The Offeree's Sophistication
Cases arising after Ralston Purinahave emphasized the sophistication of the
offerees in determining whether the particular class of persons affected needs the
protection of the act. In Repass v. Rees,40 the court found that the offerees involved were experienced businessmen and investors who did not need the protection of the act. Woodward v. Wrnght41 put the criterion of whether the offerees
could fend for themselves in terms of sophistication. However, Professor Loss
argues that the Supreme Court's language in Ralston Purinadoes not support the
view that the availability of the exemption depends on the sophistication of the
offerees or buyers, rather than their possession of, or access to, information, regarding the issuer.42 Professor Steffen argues further that not only do these cases
go beyond the test of Ralston Purina but that the courts in general have gone
beyond the intent of Congress when it first phrased the private offering exemption. He argues that "private" should not turn on the sophistication and knowledge of the offeree; rather, all offers should be registered except those to a few43
Regardless of the opinions expressed by these writers, there is no doubt that
the federal courts recognize the sophistication of the offeree as an important
factor in considering whether the offer is public or private. The Securities Exchange Commission supports this view in generally not requiring registration of
private placements to institutional investors. 44 With the purpose of the California
act being not only full disclosure but also protection of the investor from an
unfair offering, the Califorma courts and the Commissioner have a stronger and
more explicit statutory basis than have the federal courts in considermg the sophistication of the offeree as a prime factor in determining whether the offering is
private.
While the Califorma courts as yet have not developed a sophisticated offeree
criterion, the Commissioner has been very concerned with the sophistication of
0

89 SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962.
40 174 F Supp. 898, 904 (D. Colo. 1959).
41266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th Cir. 1959).
42 1 Loss, SEcurrs REGULATON 664 (1961).
43

Steffen, The Prwvate Placement Exemption: What To Do about a FortuitousCombination in Restraint of Trade, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 211, 220-23 (1963).
44 SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962; see Orrick, Some
Observations on the Adminstration of the Securities Laws, 42 M-N. L. REv. 25, 33
(1957).
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the offerees. 45 In recogmzing ths concern one firm, in applying to the Commsioner for a permit to issue limited partnerslnp interests as securities, developed
a questionnaire stressing the education, employment, financial status, mvestments
in real estate, and the relationship of the offeree to the other offerees and to the
46
offeror.
Unlike full disclosure, which is a nearly absolute requirement of a private
offering, the requirement of sophistication is relative and must be weighed with
factors of "relationslup."
Relation of the Offeree to the Offeror and to the Other Offerees
There are two "relationslups" that are factors in determining the availability
of the private offering exemption: (1) the "close-knitness" of the original offerorofferee group; and, (2) the legal relationship established by the ]omt adventure
or partnership agreements between the offeror and offerees and among the vanous offerees.
The Close-Knit Group
As discussed above, the Supreme Court espoused the criterion that the exemption is available where persons, because of their position, have access to the same
kid of information that the act would make available. 47 Carlos Isreals suggests
that position could be "any significant economic relationship to the issuer."48
Orrck concurs with this view when he notes that the Securities Exchange Commissioner is concerned with the "relationship of the offerees to the issuer--such asclose affiliation with directors and officers, existing financial interest in the issuer
through securities ownership, and debtor-creditor, customer or attorney-client
relationships." 49 The Division of Corporations suggests that a satisfactory "economic position" would be one where the offeree had sufficient knowledge of the
issuer and the venture, such as the issuer's business management capacities, hIs
reputation for honesty, the financing and structure of the venture, and the risks
involved m it.n0
There is no question that an offeree picked at random would not be considered as having a sufficiently umque economic position to bring him within the
Supreme Court test.51 On the other hand the courts and the Commissioner have
allowed relatives and friends to come within the exemption, even though they are
45

Interview With Robert LaNoue, xi Sacramento, Nov. 1965; Interview With H.
Mattes, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, C. San Felipe, Deputy Commissioner
of Corporations, and C. Howard, Supervising Deputy Commissioner, in San Francisco,
Feb. 24, 1966.
46 Interview With M. Starr, Oakland Attorney and Author, in Oakland, Feb. 18,
1966.
47 SEC
48

v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953).
Isreals, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. R y. 851,

859 (1959).
49
Ornck, supra note 44, at 33.
5
o Interview With Robert LaNoue, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, in
Sacramento, Nov. 1965.
51 Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., Inc., 12 Cal. 2d 501, 514, 86 P.2d 102, 108

(1939).
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not necessarily in any economic position in relation to the offeror.5 2 Here the
offeree's personal knowledge of the offeror outweighs any lack of knowledge of
the project, and perhaps any lack of sophstication. However, as the relative or
friend becomes more distant the knowledge of the project and the sophistication
of the offeree become increasingly more important.5 3 The federal courts, when
concluding that a private offering is present under these circumstances, usually
state that the group was a "close-knit arrangement among friends and acquaintances
"54
on a purely personal basis without any systematic scheme or promotion
As the syndicator goes beyond his immediate circle of friends and acquaintances, the question of who constitutes a "close-knit" group becomes exceedingly
more difficult to answer. The same is true where there are several offerors each
making offers to Ins associates who are totally unrelated to the other offeror.
The federal courts have held that the group is close-knit: where the offeree
was introduced to the offeror through a middleman, but had participated with
him on a previous project; 55 where the offeree was known to one offeror-partner
but not to the other; 56 and where the offeree was introduced to the offeror by
57
another offeree.
In one federal district court case, 58 the court concluded that an offering made
through a broker to the broker's friends of "long standing" was private. These
friends were previously unknown to the offeror, but the court found that the
group was "close knit" even though one offeree had brought a friend into the
project who was unknown to both the broker and the offeror, and furthermore,
the broker was paid a commission. In coming to this unusual conclusion the
court stressed three factors: that the number of offerees was in the vicinity of
fourteen and was thus under the twenty-five person rule of thumb of the Commissioner; that the offerees were all sophisticated; and that they were given an
adequate opportunity to inform themselves about the project and thus did not
need the protection of the act.
While the Califorma courts have not specifically discussed an offering to
persons beyond the immediate circle of friends and acquaintances of the offeror,
in Camenz v. Long,59 which involved thirty-four and forty-six offerees, it is
doubtful that all the offerees were known directly to the offeror. It would seem
that the California courts should take the additional step and follow the federal
lead and hold that a transaction such as that above is a private offering.
52

Famsworth v. Nevada-Cal Management, Ltd., 188 Cal. App. 2d 382, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 531 (1961); Camenni v. Long, 184 Cal. App. 2d 292, 8 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1960);
Interview With Robert LaNoue, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, in Sacramento,
Nov. 531965.
lnterview With H. Mattes, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, C. San
Felipe, Deputy Commissioner of Corporations, and C. Howard, Supervising Deputy
Commissioner of Corporations, in San Francisco, Feb. 24, 1966.
54
Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F Supp. 104, 112 (D. Minn. 1958), quoting
Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F Supp. 975, 977 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
55 Campbell v. Degenther, supra note 54.
56 Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963).
57
Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959). Interview With Robert
LaNoue, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, in Sacramento, Nov. 1965.
58 Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1958).
59 184 Cal. App. 2d 292, 8 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1960).
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However, the Division of Corporations seems to draw a more constricted
circle about the offeror in considering the requisites for a close-knit group. The
Division tends to require not only that an offeree introduced to the offeror through
a middleman be knowledgeable and sophisticated, but that the middleman must
be himself an offeree or offeror and very closely related to the new offeree; for
example, as a spouse or very close friend. If the middleman is paid a comm,ssion
for bringing in an offeree then the offer would be considered public.60 While
under the federal decisions it would seem that sophisticated real estate investors
who are not known to each other directly but only indirectly by a web of connections could syndicate in small numbers of less than twenty-five, under the
Division of Corporation's view so to do would amount to a public offering. Even
considering the protection intended to be afforded by the California act as contrasted with the federal, if this type of offeree is in a position of knowledge there
is no need to protect him by requiring a permit, provided that he is not part of
an exceedingly large group of offerees, since he-is usually more expert than the
Commissioner in evaluating such an offer. Certainly when such a group numbers
less than twenty-five it should be considered private by the Commissioner as
well as the courts.
The Legal Relationship Established by the Joint Adventure or
Limited Partnership
Two factors which qualify the availability of the private offering exemption
flow from the peculiar limitation of the California exemption to the legal entities
of partnershups and ]omt adventures. First, since the Califorma exemption provides for only these certain entities, the association created must conform both
in substance and in form-the entity must be bona fide. Second, since the purpose
of the California act is to protect the public against the imposition of unsubstantial, unlawful and fraudulent stock and investment schemes and the securities
based on them, the protection afforded the investor by the incidents of the entity
agreement will be a factor in determining whether the offerees need the protection of the act.
The California courts have required that the partnerslp or ]omt adventure
be bona fide. 61 Bona fide as the court has discussed it rests on the concept of
delectus personarum-the right to determine membership. Thus the court has
said that "as long as the requirement of unammous agreement on the body of
membership is preserved it would appear clear that the partnership is not an
issuer of a 'security."' 62 However, where the issuer went among his relatives,
friends, and acquaintances, persons who would otherwise be considered a "closeknit" group, seeking those who would invest in his enterprise in return for a share
of the contemplated profits, one by one designating those who would be allowed
inthe venture, and collecting the money from each as he was designated, with6
OInterview With H. Mattes, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, C. San
Felipe, Deputy Commissioner of Corporations, and C. Howard, Supervising Deputy
Commi sioner of Corporations, m San Francisco, Feb. 24, 1966.
61 Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1961); Farnsworth
v. Nevada-Cal Management, Ltd., 188 Cal. App. 2d 382, 10 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1961).
62 Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 21, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587, 593 (1961), quoting Dahlquist, Regulation andCivil Liability Under the Californta Corporate Securities
Act, 33 CALiF. L. REv. 343, 363 (1945).
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out the group so much as ever coming together, the offering was considered the
offering of a security and not within the private offering exemption. 63 In order
to meet this requirement of delectus personarum, no partner may be admitted
without the unamnimous approval of the membership; however, in the case of a
limited partnership the certificate of partnership may allow the addition or substitution of a new partner without the unammous approval of the membership.
In the latter case the certificate must expressly state the terms and conditions of
the substitution or admission. In either such case the certificate must be amended
and signed and sworn to by all partners, including any member to be substituted
or added, and when a limited partner is to be substituted, also by the assigning
limited partner.6 4
While the Division of Corporations has indicated that it is not overly concerned with the concept of delectus personarum,it is concerned with the relationship of the original partners (as discussed above) and that the interests in the
entity are not freely transferable (to insure that an offering which is originally
private remains pnvate).65 Therefore, in order to satisfy the Commissioner's concern with keeping the offering private, and the court's concern to retain unammous approval of the membership, the transferability of the interests should be
prohibited or severely restricted.
The language of the court in discussing the concept of the bona-fide partnerslup indicates that if this element is present then the partnership is not an issuer
of a security.6 6 This is not true. While the bona-fide entity is an essential requisite
6

3Rivlin v. Levine, supra note 62, at 23, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
Id. at 21, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 592, quoting Dahlquist, supra note 61.
65
Intervew With Robert LaNoue, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, in

64

Sacramento, Nov. 1965; Interview With H. Mattes, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, C. San Felipe, Deputy Commissioner of Corporations, and C. Howard, Supervising Deputy Commissioner of Corporations, in San Francisco, Feb. 24, 1966. In one

case where a syndicator using a ]oint venture entity did apply for a permit, the Commissioner required that all documents evidencing the securities contain in capital letters
the followmg statement: "The sale of this security is authorized by permit of the Commissioner of Corporations which provides that the owner of this security shall not
consummate a sale, transfer (whether or not for value), pledge or hypothecation of it,
or any interest therein, or any portion thereof, or receive any consideration therefore,
until the written consent or permit of the Commissioner shall first have been obtained
so to do." Interview With M. Starr, Attorney and Author in Oakland, Feb. 18, 1966.
This suggests the concern that the Commissioner has in seeing that an originally private
offeree does not become a conduit resulting in sales to the public.
66 "As long as the requirement of unanimous agreement (delectus personarum)
is preserved it would appear clear that the partnership is not an issuer of a security."
Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 21, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587, 592 (1961). The court's
misleading statement is a quote from an article by Dahlquist, supra note 62, at 363-64,
which was a reply to an article by H. Smith, Limited PartnershipInterests as Securities
Under the Corporate Securities Act, 19 Los ANGELES B.A. BurLL. 257 (1944), Smith
argued that under the old Califorma Corporate Securities Law a partnership interest

was a security. After the act was amended to provide the present exemption for partnership and joint adventure interests which are not offered to the public, Cal. Stat. 1945,
ch. 399, § 2(b)12, at 856, Dahlquist argued that Smith was wrong and that so long as
the entity was a partnership in both form and substance-a bona-fide partnership-the
interests offered would not be subject to regulation. He further argued that the amend-
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if a syndicator is to have available the private offering exemption, it is not the
only consideration. For example, if a syndicator were to make a public offering
in a newspaper to investors in general, there would be an immediate violation
of the act notwithstanding that the group later came together and mutually selected each other. If the project went sour in spite of the fact that there was
mutual selection of members, the court would say that this was a security
originally offered to the public. The syndicator would then be subject to civil
and criminal liability.
The factor that provides the attorney with the most versatility is the relationship between the offeror and offerees, and among the several offerees, as created
in the entity agreement. In the same way that the Supreme Court has construed
the federal exemption in light of the protection that the investor was to be
afforded by the act-full disclosure-it would seem that if the California investor
were to have the same protection that the California act would provide, the offering would be more likely considered private. However, as Professor Loss warned
concerning the federal act, just as one cannot expect to escape federal regulation by merely offering ample information, one should not expect to escape the
Califorma act by merely providing the investor with protection. However, if one
does provide such protection, he should expect the Commissioner and the court
to be far more liberal in interpreting the exemption. To this end the syndicator
should take into account three points: (1) the fairness of the return on the investment; (2) the exposure of the investor to loss; and (3) the control of the
syndicate.
The project should be sound, offering the investor a fair return. The syndicator
as it becomes larger, he should consider
may build in any return for himself, but
67
ways to assure the investor hIs profit.
The protection of the investor, aside from assuring him a fair return, should
limit Ins exposure to loss in two ways. First, the investor should be allowed to
recover his capital outlay before any distribution to the syndicator; or if the investors are less sophisticated, more numerous, or have less contacts with the
offeror, the investor should perhaps be allowed to take a percentage of his profits
before the syndicator takes Ins, thus ensuring that the interests will not be watered
from the begmmng.68 Second, the investor should be allowed to withdraw from
ment to the act was a change in form only and not insubstance. However, as evidenced
by the example in the text, there was a change in substance. Partnership and joint adventure interests were specifically made subject to the act, except in one instancewhere the interests are not offered to the public. Therefore, even if the element of
delectus personarum exists, if there is a public offering, the exemption will not be available 67
and the interests will be subject to regulation.
Interview With M. Starr, Attorney and Author, in Oakland, Feb. 18, 1966.
68 Ibtd. For example: "Any gain realized by the partnership from the sale of any
of its assets shall be distributed as follows: A. All or so much of any such gain as shall
for the purpose of repaying the total capital contribution of each of
be necessary
capital contribution, an amount
said Lnited Partners. B. Upon repayment of the
C. The remainshall be distributed to the Limited Partners
equal to six percent
" Or, if the syndicator is just an
ing portion shall be distributed to the partners
agent rather than a partner: "provided, however, that if the joint venturers do not
on their capital contriburealize at least three hundred (300) percent gross return
at the time of
(the agent)
then no additional fee shall be payable to
tion
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the partnership at any time under reasonable conditions. Not only does this limit
the investor's exposure, it benefits the syndicate since the unhappy limited partner
is usually more burden than benefit. 69
The lack of investor control has caused the Division of Corporations, especially
in the past, to be hesitant in granting permits to offer interests in limited partnerships to the public. 70 This policy becomes stricter when the offering of the limited
partnership interest is argued to be a private offering and thereby not subject to
the Division's regulation. Since 1963, when the Corporations Code was amended
to allow the limited partners a certain amount of control over entity management, 71 the Division's policy has become somewhat more liberal. 72 Therefore, in
order to allay this concern, the syndicator should provide for a significant amount
of control to be vested in the limited partners, while being careful not to make
them general partners. 73
sale of the said real property." Provisions from agreements drawn by the firm of Miller,
Starr and Regalia, obtained during an Interview With M. Starr, Attorney and Author,
Feb. 69
18, 1966.
Interview With M. Starr, Attorney and Author, in Oakland, Feb. 18, 1966. For
example: "Any ]oint venturer may voluntarily retire from the joint venture at any time,
by giving
(30) days written notice.
Said notice
shall include an offer to
sell
at a pnce eqivalent to the purchase price.
[Tihe joint venture shall have
the exclusive right to accept the offer
provided however, that if the joint venture
shall determine not to purchase
the remaining venturers shall have the exclusive
right to purchase.
Any interest
not purchased
may be offered to other interested parties." Provisions from agreements drawn by the firm of Miller, Starr and
Regalia, obtained during an Interview With M. Starr, Attorney and Author, Feb. 18,
1966. 0
1 Interview With Robert LaNoue, Assistant Commissioner
of Corporations,
in

Sacramento, Nov. 1965.
71 CAL. Conp. CODE

§§ 15502(1)a, 15507(b).

72Interview With Robert LaNoue, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, in
Sacramento, Nov. 1965; Interview With H. Mattes, Assistant Commssioner of Corporations, C. San Felipe, Deputy Commissioner of Corporations, and C. Howard, Supervising Deputy Commissioner of Corporations, in San Francisco, Feb. 24, 1966.
73 For example, in a joint adventure agreement: "Except as specifically provided
for herein, all decisions with respect to the conduct of'the joint venture business and the
sale of its assets including the terms and conditions of the sale of the joint ventures
real property, shall be made by joint venturers owning 51% or more of the interest in
the joint venture." Provision from an agreement drawn by the firm of Miller, Starr and
Regalia, obtained during an Interview With M. Starr, Attorney and Author, in Oakland,
Feb. 18, 1966. Or, for example, in a limited partnership agreement: "the Limited
Partners shall, pursuant to the terms and provisions of section 15502 of the Califorma
Corporation Code, have the right to
vote for the election of or removal of a General
Partner and to cause other action to be effected
as such right is set forth in and
governed by section 15502(1) (a)XV of said Califorma Corporation Code
and
shall include
termination of the partnership, any amendment of the partnership
agreement, and the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the partnership.
All sales of the real estate
shall be made upon the recommendation of the General
Partners and the confirmation
of
at least 51% of the total limited partnerslp
interest." Provisions from an agreement drawn by the firm of Miller, Starr and Regalia,
obtained during an Interview With M. Starr, Attorney and Author, in Oakland, Feb.
18, 1966.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

Provision should be made for adequate regular reports to the members. Voting
rights should be given the limited partners which will allow them to voice their
concern on major acquisitions, sales, and liquidations, and on the removal of a
4
general partner from a management position. As to the removal of a general
partner, the Division of Corporations has argued that while this is legally possible,
usually the limited partners do not have the skill to manage the entity, or the
desire to mcur the liability of a general partner; therefore as a practical matter,
they will never exercise this power. 75 Therefore, in a questionable case, the
syndicator may go so far as to desigu the syndicate so that he is only the agent
of the syndicate, subject to dismissal at any time, with his compensation coming
6
in the form of a fixed fee or a percentage of the profits.7
on how obviously
depending
vary,
should
The use of the foregoing provisions
private the offering is. At most their use will encourage the Commissioner or the
court to find that the offering was not made to the widows, children, and incompetents that the act was designed to protect. And if the syndicator is looking
at the long run, he will find that the Commissioner's concerns are not necessarily
antithetical to his own.
Conclusion
In order for the syndicator using a limited partnership or joint adventure
entity to come within the private offering exemption to the California Securities
Law he should:
(1) Offer the interest to less than twenty-five persons who generally meet the
other requirements below, so that the group will come within the standard generally adopted around the country for a small or private offering.
(2) Offer the interest only to investors sophsticated in the particular field, who
have been given or have access to all the material facts concerning the syndicator
and the project, or to very close relatives or friends who have, in lieu of a sophisticated knowledge of the project, a thorough personal knowledge of the issuer.
(3) Offer the interest only to persons who have been associated with the syndicator in the past, preferably in business, or who have been, assocaated with
other offerees or offerors who have been associated with the syndicator in the
past.
(4) Offer such interest on the condition that the offeree will be allowed to
purchase such interest only if his membership in the partnership or joint adventure
is unammously approved by all other members of the syndicate.
(5) Provide in the entity agreement: that the assignability of the interests is
severely limited;" that the investor have suficient priority over the syndicator in
withdrawing funds from the project to cover his original investment and perhaps
a percentage of his profits; that the investor should be able to withdraw from
the syndicate at will subject only to reasonable conditions; and that control over
74 Ibid.
75 Interview With H. Mattes, Assistant Commissioner of Corporations, C. San
Felipe, Deputy Commissioner of Corporations, and C. Howard, Supervising Deputy
Commissioner of Corporations in San Francisco, Feb. 24, 1966.
76 Interview With M. Starr, Attorney and Author, in Oakland, Feb. 18, 1966; see
68 supra.

